top of page
The public vision

 

Anahnu movement is leading a new Israeli consensus. Israel's social cohesion has been deteriorating in the last decades, because the rival cultural groups within Israel are getting stronger at the expense of one another, and because there are disagreements on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Our goal is to prevent a social rift through groundbreaking social enterprises and by resolving the disputes between left-wing and right-wing Israelis, religious and secular Israelis, Jews and Arabs.


For that purpose, we are proposing the Equal Partners program, based on a Win-Win principle: all political groups within Israel will be strengthened together, as well as the State of Israel and the Palestinians, without any side leaving its fate in the hands of the other. We call for the establishment of a separate Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with a safe Jewish minority, alongside the establishment of a federal Jewish and democratic constitution in Israel with an enlarged and equal Palestinian minority. Our federal approach recommends the forming of non-territorial constitutional communities which would provide religious and cultural services in Israel.

Why is Israel splitting?

A federal Jewish and democratic constitution

Borders

Right of return and Settlements

Security

Temple Mount

Operating in the field

Anchor 1
Why is Israel splitting?

In the current situation, the culture war between the political groups in Israel is expanding. Our governance structure has a resource allocation mechanism that discriminates against non-Jewish citizens, and government ministers representing a certain public can disqualify any educational, religious or cultural program of another public. Israel also compels its citizens to get married in its religious institutions. This situation drives many Jews away from their national heritage due to their objection to being coerced. Similarly, many members of the Palestinian community in Israel refuse to cooperate with the state and feel the need to protect themselves from having 'the Israeli identity' imposed on them. Thus extremists who wish to close ranks and avoid compromise are getting stronger and the Israeli democracy is being torn apart. 

Simultaneously, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been prolonging for many years, because in the past hundred years the Israelis have gotten stronger at the expense of the Palestinians. Both sides are responsible for the situation that ensued: in order to establish a Jewish state with a Jewish majority, the Zionist movement brought Jews from all over the world and gave them resources of land, security, and culture. But by doing so it harmed the Palestinian lands and markets, treating them with no responsibility or solidarity. The Palestinians, on their part, became fixated with the notion that a Jewish state had no right to exist, due to their refusal to acknowledge Jewish national history. Therefore, a violent confrontation arose between both sides during the British mandate.

Over the years, several attempts have been made to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nevertheless, the confrontation remains, among other things because no solution has been found to the problem of the Palestinian refugees from 1948, because of the Israeli occupation and Palestinian terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These problems perpetuate Israel's ongoing strengthening at the expense of Palestine. The 1990s' peace process did not try to change the structure of the relationship between the nations, but only to set a border and separate between them, and this was one of the reasons why it failed.

Demo
A federal Jewish and democratic constitution

Every group of citizens comprising 6% or more of the general population would be able to establish its own independent constitutional community, with no territorial authorities, which would provide its members with religious and cultural services. These services will include all known religious and cultural institutions, alongside formal education in history, bible, literature and educational hours at school, as well as informal education.

The central federal government will be in charge of all other government functions, including health, policing, transportation, defense, welfare and foreign relations, and its state symbols will be Jewish, as they are today. At the same time, several changes in constitutional articles will be made: the central government will be neutral regarding the status of religion, a new stanza will be added to the national anthem, in which reference will be made to the partnership of all constitutional communities in Israel, a civics curriculum will be shared by all, and the day after Independence Day will mark the covenant for the unity of all Israeli citizens whoever they may be. Changing these articles of the constitution will be possible with a 75% majority in the parliament or in a referendum.

Through the new federal model we are proposing, Israeli citizens will gain full individual freedoms. Without the compulsion we have today, the citizens will choose whether and what they prefer to practice from the Jewish heritage, and their national identity will be strengthened. The Palestinian citizens of Israel will also undergo a similar process of strengthening their national heritage. The national covenant between all the constitutional communities will consolidate into a common Israeli civic identity.

state
Borders

The border line between the parties will be based on the 1967 lines and land swaps in Jewish residential neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and other areas. This border will define the sovereignty of both states but won't serve as a security or social separation line between the peoples and parts of the homeland. We believe it's important to base negotiations on the 1967 lines because both sides claim the entire land as their homeland, and this is practically the only line with historical logic that can be defended.

right
Right of return and Settlements

We propose allowing the Jewish community in Palestine and the Palestinian community in Israel to exist as certain percentages of the total population of both states. The Palestinian government will allow Jewish settlers to choose to remain in their homes as citizens with equal rights and obligations in the Palestinian state, alongside their additional Israeli citizenship, or to evacuate and receive compensation from the Israeli government. The size of the Jewish community in Palestine will be a certain percentage of the state's total population, will have cultural autonomy, and its members will serve in the IDF or in national-civil service in Israel or Palestine, according to their choice. Additionally, Israel will continue providing all civil services currently given to Israeli residents beyond the Green Line until the Palestinian state reaches Israeli standards of quality of life and democracy. This framework will also provide civil services to the Palestinian state until it becomes established as a prosperous and stable state.

We believe many settlers could support this policy if the Zionist left returns to seeing Jewish settlement in the entire Land of Israel as a founding value, in accordance with our new approach.

In return, Palestinian refugees and their descendants will receive compensation for their suffering, and alongside this, the Israeli government will allow them to return to Israel as citizens with equal rights and obligations, as long as a solid Jewish majority of 70% of the state's total population is maintained. The refugees' entry into Israel will be spread over fifty years, and Israel's Jewish-democratic character cannot be changed without 75% support from Israel's citizens including a substantial majority of its Jewish citizens. However, if the refugees don't abide by the law, fail to integrate properly, or if it becomes apparent that the Arab society is about to exceed the 30% threshold of Israel's citizens, Israel will stop their entry process until the situation changes.

Beyond this, the constitutional arrangement details for Palestinians in Israel will be identical to the arrangement for Jews in Palestine. This is the only way the Palestinian side can reconcile its claim to the right of return with its recognition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

This proposal carries no new risks for the Jewish side, since even today the Palestinian percentage in Israel could grow beyond 30% without them recognizing Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Therefore, it's beneficial for the Jewish side to agree to our right of return framework to uproot the demographic conflict between the sides and enable Palestinian recognition of Zionism's historical rights. Additionally, our framework will unite the Jewish people behind a comprehensive solution that recognizes the Jewish connection to the entire land with full equal rights for both peoples.

This is the only way to transform the diplomatic arrangement from a means of separation and painful concessions that break down the political systems on both sides into a framework that enables internal unity in both peoples alongside reconciliation and equal partnership between them.

security
Security

In our security framework, neither side will place its fate in the hands of the other. The diplomatic agreement between the parties will state that Israeli withdrawal will occur in several stages and only according to results on the ground. If Israel believes Palestinians are not properly handling threats against its citizens, it will return to the area until the threat is removed. Additionally, an international observer mechanism will be established to monitor the parties' actions, and on the eastern border, a joint regional security regime will be established for Israel, Palestinians, and Jordanians alongside the Palestinian control system.

Based on these principles, the Israeli withdrawal will occur in two stages:

In the first stage, a Palestinian state will be established and Palestinians will commit to fighting terrorism by themselves. Meanwhile, the IDF and all Israeli security forces will remain in Palestinian territory, as happens today. If Palestinians meet this commitment, the IDF won't leave its base gates, but if the IDF believes Palestinians don't intend to meet their commitment, it will act in their place to remove the terrorist threat in the same operational pattern it uses today. Simultaneously, both sides will be required to report to an international observer mechanism. The observer force will be managed by a committee composed of Israeli representatives, Palestinian representatives, and agreed-upon representatives of the international community. The observer force will replace all other international frameworks dealing with the conflict. The committee's role will be to quantitatively measure, according to parameters agreed upon in advance between the parties, the threats and violence between the parties and regularly report to the UN Security Council on the implementation process of the agreement between the parties.

In the second stage, after five continuous years during which the Palestinian side independently removes all terrorist threats against Israelis and proves its sincere intentions, the IDF will withdraw to new readiness areas and prepare to defend Israeli communities, main routes, and Palestine's eastern border. At this stage, all IDF forces in Palestine will be subject to international military command, whose missions will be defined in advance in the permanent settlement as part of a joint security mechanism for Israel and Palestine. IDF forces will have no other authorities in Palestinian territory. IDF forces will not be allowed to arrest, block, or restrict Palestinian citizens in any way. The IDF's deployment in Palestinian territory will be similar in character to international forces' deployment in conflict zones. However, if after the complete withdrawal Palestinians don't meet their commitment and an emergency situation arises including a threat to Israelis' safety, the IDF will immediately return to its positions within Palestinian territory and disconnect from international command until the threat is removed, and so forth.

This security approach isn't utopian and isn't based on trust, but on ground results. We assume the reconciliation process between the peoples might be cut short and delayed for many years or even generations. Therefore, in the optimistic scenario, both peoples will succeed in leveraging our proposal for full reconciliation and open borders, and in the pessimistic scenario, the situation of both peoples will stabilize slightly despite the continued conflict between them until the day full reconciliation arrives.

Although our proposed process is not without risks and does not guarantee that Israel can necessarily return to the territory to defend itself, correspondingly, Palestinians have no assurance that Israel won't cite various circumstances to prolong the occupation. However, all these risks exist today as well. Israel may be dragged into a security disaster similar to what happened on October 7, irresponsible withdrawal due to international pressure, a third intifada, or internal discord just as happened during the Disengagement or almost happened in the Trump deal. Palestinians, for their part, are already experiencing an ongoing occupation of more than half a century. In Gaza there is destruction and devastation on an unimaginable scale. Therefore, our proposal contains no new risks, only new solutions. Even if the pessimistic scenario materializes and the parties abandon their agreements and continue to struggle against each other, our situation would still be better than the current reality. Both sides will strengthen their internal unity and international stability. Additionally, Israel will gain Palestinian recognition of its right to self-defense and a more favorable international framework for managing its affairs, while Palestinians will gain a new international framework that will force Israel to provide explanations for its actions. Therefore, both sides would prefer to outline an agreed-upon long-term vision and manage the conflict under this umbrella rather than continue the conflict in its current state. But above all, we believe that if the permanent settlement is based on this sober security concept, we can eventually, after a long process, achieve mutual Pardon and complete reconciliation between the peoples.

jer
Temple Mount

There is intense internal disagreement within the Jewish people regarding the Temple Mount's status. In practice, sovereignty over the compound belongs to the Muslim Waqf and Palestinians. They are the only ones who build in the compound and determine if and how to allow Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount.

To break out of our current deadlock, we propose adopting the approach of those who returned during the Second Temple period, who acknowledged Persian, Greek and Roman control of the Temple Mount to advance their national goal, abandoning the "all or nothing" approach. Similarly, we must recognize the sovereignty Palestinians already have on the Temple Mount. Accordingly, we propose striving to establish a Jewish prayer plaza and conduct archaeological excavations in the compound with Palestinian agreement, as well as establish, inspired by Herzl's vision, an Israeli national Jewish heritage institution in Jerusalem at the Southern Wall compound, near but outside the mosque plaza. This institution will connect Jewish tradition to modern Zionism and focus on agreed-upon values associated in the Bible and rabbinic tradition with the Temple Mount, such as criticism of government, standing with society's weak, national solidarity among all tribes of Israel, world peace, and individual and public prayer. This way, the Temple Mount will become a solid foundation for national and historical cohesion among all shades of the Jewish people instead of a center of division and disagreement.

Only thus, when we reorganize and break free from our current deadlock, can the Temple Mount truly stand at the heart of national consensus - and we will correct the baseless hatred that destroyed Jerusalem thousands of years ago. In the subsequent stage, regarding unresolved disputes, no one knows their solution and neither do we, but our value judgment is that any future change made after implementing the agreement will be reached by consensus among all Jewish and Palestinian parties.

field
Operating in the field

We are establishing groundbreaking social institutions for mutual partnerships between national, religious and secular groups in Israel.

As a first step, we are establishing student villages for common and diverse populations in Israel. The villages will provide the program participants with cheaper housing and help them find their way into the private job market. In return, they will do volunteer work for the community and participate in a populations studies program.

We are also working to produce joint tours and encounters to bring together a variety of groups among the Jewish people, as well as Jews and Palestinians, in order to create new symbols of an Israeli shared society. Furthermore, we are promoting a project on the Sabbath which will allow cultural and recreational institutions to operate in a format agreed upon by the secular public, the heads of the ultra-orthodox public and the directors of cultural institutions, in order to create a new unity on the Sabbath day.

Later on we shall address the establishment of additional institutions for partnerships between Israeli groups that are far apart from one another, for the sake of all Israeli citizens whoever they may be. Our constitutional positions and social institutions have received written support from Israel Prize laureates, senior academics and mayors, former senior members of the defense establishment and clerics; Jews and Arabs, religious and secular, men and women. 'Anahnu' (Hebrew for 'we').

magen_d3.png
  • Black Facebook Icon
  • Black LinkedIn Icon

© 2018 Anahnu

Design: Tao Studio

Join us

bottom of page