The Enduring Hope

This article explains how the connection between the Palestinian conflict and Israel's internal crisis endangers the Zionist project and what we must do to overcome this crisis. In 1897, the First Zionist Congress convened in Basel, Switzerland. It was a fateful hour for the Jewish people. In Europe, modern antisemitism began to erupt and worsen the situation of Jews. In Islamic countries, Jews suffered from the inferior status of unequal minorities. The Jewish people were divided and characterized by gaps in language, culture, and values. Many wondered what they should do.

In the midst of this extreme turmoil emerged the leadership of Theodor Herzl. In his opening speech at the First Zionist Congress in Basel, he sought to encourage the spirits of the conference participants in the face of growing waves of despair. First, he presented a sober view of the challenge: "...we see and feel ourselves surrounded by ancient hostility everywhere. Antisemitism is its modern name..." Then he presented to the audience the only advantage of the Zionist movement at that time: "the close connection between the most modern elements of Judaism with the most conservative ones." This initial unifying connection between the group of liberal Jews and the group of religious Jews was the central achievement of Zionism at that time. Herzl believed that this connection would successfully overcome any practical obstacle. The political movement he established managed to survive for decades after his death and ultimately led to the miracle of the establishment of the State of Israel. What we have now began with his vision.

Herzl's speech at the First Zionist Congress, 1897

However, now we must admit that relying on antisemitism as the unifying glue of the Zionist movement came at a heavy price. Right now, Israeli society is engaged in a difficult war against many external enemies, yet this does not prevent us from splitting and dividing from within. This challenge requires a renewed examination of the relationship between the political and civil disputes in Israeli society.

The Palestinian Challenge and the Civil Challenge

Many commentators have pointed to the government's decision to resume fighting in the Gaza Strip while simultaneously restarting the judicial revolution as a way to obscure its responsibility for its many failures. But in my opinion, the connection between the war and the judicial revolution is broader. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the civil disputes within Israel are not separate issues but are intertwined. Israel's social, political, and identity structure creates a situation where solving one issue requires addressing the other. There are two main reasons for this: a practical-political reason and an identity-value reason.

(a) Practical reason – Many players in the political system cannot participate in a coalition without first agreeing on a shared vision regarding the Palestinian issue. For example, many senior officials in Arab parties tend to show understanding for the motives of some Palestinian terrorist organizations or make various comparisons between the IDF's activities and those of terrorist organizations. This position is not legitimate but can be changed through a complex and mutual process [1]. However, as long as this is the political reality, the heads of the Zionist opposition in Israel face obstacles in forming alliances with them. As a result, the opposition struggles to replace the incumbent government, as shown by many polls conducted since October 7.

Moreover, most voters from the right-wing religious-Zionist public oppose cooperation with center-left parties. Such cooperation would include strengthening the Palestinian Authority and even a willingness to negotiate a Palestinian state to promote normalization with Arab countries. Therefore, at the critical juncture of election day, religious-Zionist voters chose to cooperate with the Haredi parties – with all that implies – to ensure Israel does not turn toward diplomatic negotiations.

These are just some examples demonstrating how the Palestinian issue directly affects the composition of coalitions in Israel – and therefore also the government's civil policy.

(b) Identity reason – Since the establishment of the Zionist movement, we have found it extremely difficult to recognize the collective rights of the Palestinian people. We have never declared our independent vision regarding the future of the Palestinian nation but only reacted to international pressures. Even in the current war, the government refuses to lay out its vision for the day after the war. On the other hand, the various groups within Israeli society such as Religious, Secular, Haredi, Arabs, LGBTQ, Traditional Jews who are not strictly religious, Jews from the former USSR, and more – are not equally recognized under Israeli law. For example, only the religious-Zionist public has autonomous state-funded education, unlike the secular, traditional, or Arab communities.

This means that equal rights are granted to Israeli citizens as private individuals only, while group rights are reserved solely for the united Jewish nation. All other groups between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea are not equal to each other.

As a result, we are forced to deal with many disputes on issues of religion and state, government structure, the conflict with the Palestinians, and more. The reason is simple: if you don't recognize a problem, you can't solve it. If we don't recognize the Palestinian nation, we cannot work toward an agreement with it. If we don't recognize the different groups within Israeli society, we cannot formulate democratic arrangements that protect the ways of life of all Israelis. We can only manage the many disputes but not resolve them. Thus, over the decades, a critical overload has developed that leads to political extremism and internal collapse.

To reduce this overload, we could theoretically take two approaches: either solve some of these disputes or distribute their management among different government authorities. But to do so, we would have to recognize the connection between solving the Palestinian issue and equal rights within Israeli society – and so far, we refuse to do this.

If we recognize the equal autonomies of different groups within Israeli society, then we will also have to recognize the Palestinian identity that characterizes most of Arab society in Israel. Conversely, if we seek a political solution with the Palestinians beyond the Green Line, we will also have to decide on internal issues within Israeli society, such as the future of the settlers and the right of return. Both of these issues touch on the core of Zionist and Palestinian national identity and therefore evoke strong emotions. The 1990s peace process rejected the right of return while demanding mass settlement removal, giving opponents easy targets to provoke emotions and destroy public support through extremist actions. Historical experience shows that any terrorist attack or establishment of a settlement could potentially stop the negotiations.

Therefore, instead of completely rejecting any form of settlements or right of return, we will need to recognize the Palestinian identity of most Arab society in Israel and accordingly demand that Palestinians recognize our historical connection to the area beyond the Green Line in the future Palestinian state. Only this approach can transform occupation into reconciliation and maintain support for peace despite sabotage attempts. This recognition of the Palestinian identity of Arab society in Israel will, of course, also require recognition of the other groups within Israeli society – and so we return to the same point.

This means that any attempt to address internal civil issues without dealing with the Palestinian conflict, or vice versa, is doomed to failure. Recognition of equal group rights for all populations between the Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea is a necessary condition for exiting the dual crisis – both political and civil.

Flawed Leadership

It can be assumed that the coalition leaders in the Knesset know very well from their practical experience in their long years in power that the civil and Palestinian disputes are intertwined, and therefore they exploit these connections. They understand that the dispute over the Palestinian issue requires them to cooperate with the Haredi parties, while the Zionist opposition cannot cooperate with the Arab parties. Therefore, the government chose to renew the war in Gaza alongside promoting the judicial revolution and allocating budgets to Haredi institutions. In this way, they highlight the opposition's inability to unite, while ensuring that no party will leave the coalition.

For this reason, time and again, the incumbent government chooses to return to fight in the same neighborhoods in the Gaza Strip instead of withdrawing and ending the war. Through these actions, the government endangers the lives of the hostages, ignores the erosion of our reserve forces, commits terrible injustices by restricting food from Gaza residents, and encouraging what they call "voluntary emigration," and severely damages the normalization process with moderate Arab countries. Thus, we find ourselves at a disadvantage in the face of the strengthening Turkish presence in Syria, negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, and terrorism in the West Bank. The government does not have enough soldiers and budget to continue the current policy.

To defeat Hamas, we must temporarily withdraw, release the hostages, and agree to transfer the Gaza Strip to Palestinian Authority control in a phased process. Only under these conditions can the IDF launch targeted military operations from Israeli territory against Hamas operatives until we defeat the organization over time and replace it with the Palestinian Authority.

Moreover, instead of increasing the number of soldiers recruited, the government chooses to increase the budget for Haredi yeshivas. Instead of strengthening the intelligence community, the government chose to dismiss the head of the Shin Bet who is conducting a critical investigation into Qatar's involvement in the Prime Minister's Office. Instead of managing a responsible war budget, the government chooses to increase the deficit and distribute 5 billion shekels to political funds.

The only explanation for these many contradictions is the coalition's desire to survive and escape elections at all costs. Even if the price is Israel's moral, security, and economic resilience. They know that the heavy prices Israeli society will pay for this policy will not change the deep structure of our political system. The combination of Palestinian and civil disputes blocks governmental change.

New York, July 2014. Photo: a katz / shutterstock

Our Hope

It is no wonder, then, that many worthy Israelis feel a deep sense of despair. They watch with tearful eyes as the incumbent government damages everything we hold dear. Many of them are considering leaving Israel with deep sorrow. But especially at this time, we must be determined and reject despair. We need to look at the heavy challenges before us with clarity.

First, we must stop the deterioration and division of Israeli society. To do this, we must legally protest against the government's actions. If, God forbid, the government chooses to violate a Supreme Court order or harm its independence, business leaders, labor unions, and economic organizations should initiate a general and legal strike until the government backs down.

Second, alongside the immediate need to stop the government's actions, we must present Israeli society with a vision that will unite most of Israeli society from the left and right. This vision must be based on recognizing the equal national rights of the Palestinian people and all the different groups within Israeli society. For this purpose, we will all need to take responsibility for past injustices and prefer the Jewish and Democratic state over the narrow interest of our tribe and the group close to us. This task requires all Israelis, but it demands a special effort from the religious-Zionist public whose representatives have been in power for many years and some of whose religious values contradict the basic principles of modern democracy – such as gender separation or occupation. I believe that many good people in the religious-Zionist public will agree to join this task with goodwill and creativity.

On the other hand, many in the secular public or the Israeli left will have to give up protest measures such as refusing to serve in the IDF or using local authorities to limit the resources of religious populations in central cities. These steps may be effective in the short term, but they contradict the long-term aspiration to extricate us from the crisis. Israeli society will not be able to recover from them. The justified demand of the secular public to protect Israeli democracy and receive autonomy equal to that of the religious public can and should be addressed through other means.

Especially at this time, we should remember Herzl's call at the First Zionist Congress, which pushed back unprecedented challenges with only his encouraging words: "We will not tire or weary of repeating these things until we are understood... Our Congress will be serious and elevated, a blessing to the unfortunate, a nuisance to no one, an honor to all Jews, and worthy of a past whose glory may be distant, but will never fade."

[1] For an expanded discussion of our movement's perspective on Palestinian responsibility, see our podcast (in Hebrew): Click here.

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