A New Political Camp

In 2017, I met with a local mayor from an Arab community in northern Israel. Driving through the village roads was unsettling — narrow lanes, raw sewage running through the streets, infrastructure that appeared entirely forgotten. When I arrived at the municipal building, I shared these troubling impressions with the mayor. He responded with an image: even the mightiest olive tree cannot survive when rot eats it from within. Israel may appear strong from the outside, but so long as Arab villages are abandoned and neglected, Israel will continue to collapse from within.

And what holds true for Arab villages inside Israel is doubly true beyond the Green Line. Before October 7, a prevailing assumption in Israeli society held that the Palestinian issue was not urgent — that it could be managed, deferred, and sidestepped. October 7 shattered that assumption. We woke to find that the Palestinian question is not merely a security matter, but a moral one that is reshaping Israeli society from within.

From a security standpoint, October 7 revealed that we do not have sufficient soldiers or aircraft to confront Iran alone. Without progress toward a Palestinian state, there will be no stable normalization with Saudi Arabia, no regional front against Iran, and no restoration of our international standing.

Politically, since 1967 the religious-nationalist public and the left-wing camp have struggled to cooperate, divided by their conflicting visions for the future of Judea and Samaria. Under these conditions, a significant portion of the right-wing coalition will always hesitate to break with the Haredi parties for fear of jeopardizing the settlements. At the same time, Zionist and Arab parties remain unable to form a governing coalition together. As a result, Israeli governing coalitions are inherently fragile — and a far-right minority can exploit this fragility to advance regime change or illegal, violent outposts in Judea and Samaria.

This difficult reality is not inevitable. Israeli society remains strong, creative, and resourceful. The state’s founders faced enormous challenges and overcame them — and so can we. To protect Israel’s citizens and restore social cohesion, we must shift our thinking and chart a new path toward a Palestinian state. Only then can we build the new political camp that will save Zionism.

Why the Oslo Process Failed — and What Must Be Different

The failure of the Oslo process was not coincidental. The process steered both sides toward abandoning the core of their national identity: Palestinians were asked to relinquish the right of return, while Israelis were asked to choose between their historical connection to Judea and Samaria and the values of democracy. This produced determined opposition that amplified terrorism and occupation, and ultimately unraveled the agreements.

But the problem was not only in the substance - it was also in the structure. The benefits for both sides were promised only at the end of the process, once the occupation ended and terrorism ceased. In practice, however, the costs of the peace process appeared immediately: in identity, in security, and in internal cohesion. Most Israelis and Palestinians rightly refused to accept that equation. And so public trust in Oslo collapsed.

The lesson is clear: a peace process cannot be built on internal rupture within both peoples. Both sides must gain from the reconciliation process from its very outset — not only at its conclusion.

A German delegation to Israel on an Anahnu movement tour in Jerusalem, 2019. The people photographed are not members of the movement. Photo: Alex.

A New Framework: Two States, Two Communities

The way out of this impasse is not to abandon the two-state vision - but to upgrade it. To this end, our movement proposes the vision of "Two States, Two Communities" - Israel and Palestine will exist side by side, while simultaneously recognizing minority communities within each. A Jewish community in Palestine and a Palestinian community in Israel.

Under this proposal, Israel would recognize a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines with agreed land swaps. Settlers would have a choice: remain in their homes as citizens with equal rights and obligations in both states, or receive compensation and relocate. Concurrently, Israel would agree to gradually increase the Arab share of its population from 20% to 30% over a fifty-year process with built-in safeguards.This increase would come from among the descendants of the 1948 Palestinian refugees. In this way, Israel could declare that it recognizes the Palestinian right of return and acknowledges the injustice done to all Palestinian refugees and their descendants. This recognition would only apply if the Palestinians upfront recognize the Zionist right to a Jewish and democratic state, and to a Jewish majority among Israel's citizens, and accept responsibility for the terrorism they directed against Jews and Israelis.

This arrangement does not rest on trust. Neither side would place its fate in the other's hands. The IDF would remain in Palestinian territory as a peacekeeping force under international command - not as an occupying army. Our forces would be redeployed to protect Israeli communities, main roads, and Palestine's eastern border, in cooperation with the Palestinian military and without authority to restrict or detain the Palestinian population. But should our forces assess that the Palestinian military is failing to neutralize threats to Israeli lives, they would disengage from international command and act independently to counter the threat - and so on in a repeating cycle.

Within this framework, Jewish society would no longer be forced to choose between the settlements and democracy. Many settlers would be able to support the proposal without necessarily surrendering their homes or their historical connection to Judea and Samaria. This, in turn, would allow the formation of a new political camp that unites moderate settlers, members of the left, and Arab citizens — and saves Israel from collapse.

The Palestinian side, for its part, would receive for the first time in its history Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state and of the right of return. In this way, both peoples would be spared the identity crisis that plagued them during the peace process of the 1990s.

The central advantage of our proposal is that neither people is required to reach agreements in order to benefit from the reconciliation process. If the Jewish side takes the first step and unilaterally declares its independent adoption of the “Two States, Two Communities” vision, we can build the new political camp that will pull Israel out of its crisis and stabilize our international and security standing — even without Palestinian partners. Then, when Palestinians see that the Jewish side is committed to advancing reconciliation under any scenario, they will feel secure enough to take the second step and translate the vision into reality.

An IDF officer overlooking the Gaza Strip, 2019. Ran Zisovitch / Shutterstock.com

The Risks and Prospects — Old and New

At the same time, we must acknowledge the significant risks in our proposal. How can we be certain that a Palestinian state would not become a base for terrorism? That the Arab community would not grow beyond the thirty-percent threshold? That Israel itself would not find excuses to keep the occupation going?

The answer is straightforward: none of these dangers are new. Even today, the Arab community inside Israel can grow through natural birth rates without its leaders recognizing Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Even today, the IDF does not have enough soldiers to simultaneously defend all its borders. Even today, northern communities are under attack, Hamas is rebuilding in Gaza, and the eastern border is exposed. If the current situation continues, collapse is certain. The next October 7 is not a question of if — only of when.

The real question, therefore, is not whether the proposal involves risks — but whether it offers a reality preferable to the status quo. The answer is clear: yes.

Our proposal for the establishment of a Palestinian state can only improve the situation. It is obvious that securing majority Israeli support for this vision will take many years - and so for now, we must focus on small, agreed-upon milestones that move us toward its realization and prevent extremists from dominating the discourse. This clear-eyed approach does not seek "total victory" or "peace now" — but practical milestones capable of uniting settlers, members of the left, and Arab citizens, and rescuing Zionism from the crisis we face.

The time has come to find the courage to try new paths — and real grounds for hope lie ahead.

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