Human Rights and Security (Part 1)
- Israel Piekarsh

- 22 באוג׳
- זמן קריאה 9 דקות
October 7, 2023 was supposed to be just another routine Jewish holiday on the Hebrew calendar. Instead, the cruel shadow of Jewish history returned to hover over us as many Israelis were murdered, raped, and kidnapped with extreme brutality in the Gaza envelope communities by Hamas terrorists. These terrorists made no distinction between men, women, children, elderly, civilians, soldiers, Jews, and Arabs. They harmed everyone. The chilling word "Pogrom" suddenly returned to our lives. Despite the strength and power of the IDF, we were shocked to discover that once again we were being attacked in our homes.
From that day forward, most Israelis swore that we would never again allow terrorist organizations to gain strength and threaten our borders. Many combat soldiers from all political backgrounds put aside all political disputes and courageously rushed into hell to stop the attack - and since then until now, the IDF has been conducting a military campaign in the Gaza Strip to free our hostages and defeat Hamas. We all have a duty to stand behind our fighters and their families who are making such tremendous sacrifices to protect us.

Golani Brigade fighter in southern Khan Yunis. Photo: IDF Spokesperson (from Wikipedia).
However, precisely because of this - for the sake of our fighters who are making such unbearable sacrifices - we must examine the results of the war. While we have indeed weakened Hamas in the Gaza Strip, struck the Iranian axis in Lebanon and Syria, and even set back the nuclear program on Iranian soil itself - none of this has led us to the hoped-for victory.
First, our military forces continue to be stretched far beyond our capacity in Syria, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. Beyond that, fifty hostages remain in captivity with about 20 of them still alive, and the government deficit continues to deepen. Internationally, we are experiencing a low point we have never known before: global public opinion is turning against us, our friends in the American Senate are distancing themselves from us, and the investor boycotts and international arms embargos against Israel are expanding.
But worst of all is the internal price we are paying. The war has created new rifts in Israeli society regarding the release of the hostages, drafting the Haredi yeshiva students, and fears about establishing Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip. The latest survey by the Israel Democracy Institute found that only 23% of Israelis are "optimistic about social cohesion," 28% are "optimistic about Israel's economy," and only 40% are "optimistic about the future of national security". This means that most Israelis are losing faith in Israel.
Therefore, we must painfully admit that we have moved from containment to exhaustion. From containing terror before October 7 to exhausting Israel's resources. We are weakening terrorist organizations at the price of our own collapse and surrender.
Given the unprecedented severity of the crisis we have fallen into, we must examine what went wrong?! How is it possible that we defeated Hezbollah in Lebanon and successfully dealt with Palestinian terrorist organizations in the West Bank, yet simultaneously we are failing against Hamas in the Gaza Strip? How is it possible that international support for Israel collapsed so quickly? And does the severe harm to Palestinian human rights—the destruction of the Gaza Strip, the humanitarian crisis, and the policy of "voluntary migration"—serve our security interests? IDF fighters and their families deserve real answers to these questions.
To this end, I would like to launch a series of four articles that will offer hope for rehabilitating Israeli society as a just, cohesive, secure, and prosperous society. In this current article, I will propose a new security policy for the Gaza Strip, and in the next three articles, I will discuss the impact of human rights on Israeli national security, Israeli responsibility for human rights, and Palestinian responsibility for terrorism.
The Military Campaign in the Gaza Strip
As of this writing, the campaign we are conducting against Hamas in the Gaza Strip has been ongoing for about a year and ten months and is characterized by asymmetric warfare. Israel initially adopted a policy of military raids and control of main arteries such as the Philadelphi Corridor. However, when it became clear in retrospect that Hamas was not surrendering, we moved to a new policy of taking control of territories alongside expanding restrictions on humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip. As of this writing, Israel controls about 75% of the Strip's territory, yet Hamas is still not defeated. The organization's leaders are conducting tough negotiations for the release of hostages, and the organization's military wing manages to carry out coordinated attacks against us.
In light of this, the campaign in the Gaza Strip can be described in a circular pattern. Every time it becomes clear in retrospect that Hamas is not surrendering, the Israeli government chooses to intensify military pressure - and the cycle repeats. In parallel, our attempt to prevent food supplies from reaching Hamas has led to a severe humanitarian crisis that only harms the uninvolved Palestinian population. Hamas terrorists manage to overcome these restrictions through food smuggling and theft of the limited supplies intended for the population.
A clear example of this circular pattern is the interview Netanyahu gave on February 25, 2024 to the American CBS network: "From the moment we start operating in Rafah - we will be weeks away from absolute victory. We will win the war and won't stop until we win - no Hamas battalions will remain in Rafah or anywhere else". But ultimately, in April 2025, a year and two months later, it was reported that the IDF returned to operate in Rafah. Similarly, at the beginning of May 2025, the Cabinet decided to expand the war in Gaza as part of Operation "Gideon's Chariots," which was intended to capture additional territories in the Gaza Strip with the intention of staying in them and not withdrawing. However, ultimately it turned out that this operation too did not achieve its goals.
The fundamental reason our military operations fail time and again is that we and Hamas are conducting two completely different wars. The Israeli government believes that military strikes and territorial conquest will ultimately lead to Hamas's defeat. On the other hand, Hamas's working assumption is that the more we deepen the occupation in the Gaza Strip, the more we will wear ourselves down. We will lose many casualties, harm our hostages and uninvolved Palestinians - and as a result, we will lose internal cohesion within Israeli society, the resilience of our economy, and international support - until we reach complete collapse. To implement this strategy, Hamas only needs to survive. For this, they don't need advanced military infrastructure. They can continue to harm our forces even through simple explosive devices, targeted raids, and sniper rifles - and the IDF alone cannot prevent this.
The idea that Hamas will panic from the loss of territories and perhaps even from their annexation also doesn't match the facts. Hamas terrorists believe that most of the territory of Palestine has been under Israeli occupation since 1948. Therefore, their goal is to wear down Israel until its collapse, and they are not deterred by the loss of a few more territories in the Gaza Strip or West Bank.
In simple words - we cannot defeat Hamas through territorial occupation and control of Gaza. The terrorist organization will always find a way to survive while we pay heavy prices that will lead to our collapse.
Never Again
Nevertheless, many in Israeli society believe we must pay all these prices to control the Gaza Strip. The justified concern of those who support this is that if the IDF withdraws, then Hamas will again threaten the Gaza envelope communities and re-execute the October 7 attack. Under the current conditions in Gaza, it can be assumed that no Arab government or Palestinian Authority forces will be able to prevent this. Therefore, we have no choice but to occupy the entire territory.
However, despite this justified concern, I believe that continued occupation of Gaza will not prevent the next October 7 attack and will not defeat Hamas:
First, we don't have enough soldiers. The more forces we invest in the Gaza Strip, the more we expose ourselves to the possibility of another attack like October 7 in other areas.
Second, even if we occupy all of the Gaza Strip, Hamas will still be able to continue carrying out severe infiltration attacks in the Gaza envelope communities. Several senior IDF officials have warned in recent months in closed discussions that this scenario cannot be ruled out.
Third, Hamas terrorists are hiding in a network of tunnels. In this way, they will be able to continue surviving even if the IDF controls all the territory. Even before the IDF's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, Hamas managed to build an extensive tunnel system that served the terrorists.
Fourth, the continued existing occupation in the Gaza Strip is the greatest prize we are giving to terrorism. All they have to do is continue attacking us, and in response, we will wear ourselves down. Thus we will be forced to accept an end to the war under the worst surrender conditions that will be dictated to us.
Therefore, to escape from the severe crisis we have fallen into, we must tell ourselves the painful truth that continuing the war under existing conditions is bringing a security disaster upon us. In light of this, we must adopt a new strategy that will prevent Hamas from recovering and threatening the Gaza envelope communities again.

Real concern about terrorist infiltration from the Jordan Valley. Photo: Professor Caretaker, 2017 (from Wikipedia).
Victory and Decision
In the immediate term, we must admit that continued occupation or withdrawal from the Gaza Strip cannot guarantee immediate defeat of Hamas, so we must choose the option that will carry the lowest risks. Afterward, we will continue to work toward Hamas's defeat through a combination of political solution and military effort.
In light of this, in the immediate term, we must withdraw from the Gaza Strip and end the war. We must redeploy in a narrow security zone that will temporarily protect the Gaza envelope communities, and from this new positioning point, continue to operate through targeted military operations against Hamas's expected strengthening. Alongside this, we must strive for a comprehensive hostage deal, do everything possible to rehabilitate the economy and destroyed cities in the Gaza Strip in cooperation with the international community, and help the Palestinian Authority return to the Gaza Strip until it becomes a significant governing factor.
Admittedly, this withdrawal proposal also involves many risks: First, there is a high chance that Hamas will refuse to release all hostages even in light of the above proposal. Hamas needs them to serve as a guarantee for its security. Second, it's not at all certain that the international community will allow us to continue carrying out military raids in Gaza. Third, the Palestinian Authority is a corrupt body that systematically incites against Israel and Zionism, and Hamas may infiltrate its ranks. Fourth, returning the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip may advance the establishment of a terrorist Palestinian state in the heart of Israel.
However, even these four risks pale in comparison to the risks existing in continued occupation. Even if Hamas succeeds in infiltrating the Palestinian Authority ranks - it will still be weaker compared to the current situation where no Palestinian political player interferes with it. The concern that the international community will prevent us from operating in the future also pales against the steps already being taken against us now. Moreover, everything that might be dangerous in the future from a Palestinian state is already threatening us now to an even greater extent - central cities are being bombarded by missiles from Iran and Yemen, and the danger of terrorist infiltration from the Jordan Valley or Syria is also hovering over us.
On the other hand, the policy I proposed above has new advantages: we will avoid continued exhaustion of our forces and be able to send soldiers to other sectors. The military raids that the IDF will operate against Hamas infrastructure will prevent the organization from strengthening, and it won't be able to renew the October 7 attack, and our international collapse will also be halted for now.
This means that in choosing between the disadvantages of continued occupation or withdrawal from the Gaza Strip - withdrawal is preferable. Our cooperation with the Palestinian Authority after the Second Intifada and with the Lebanese government in the current ceasefire in the north proves that this model works.
Therefore, the Israeli government should be called upon to withdraw from the Gaza Strip for security reasons. If the current government is unable to do this, we must call for elections. In parallel, Hamas should be offered a comprehensive deal for the release of all our hostages. If Hamas refuses, then it will be exposed to everyone as the cruel terrorist organization that has been lying all along, and we will know that we did everything possible to free our hostages. Afterward, we must withdraw and continue to apply combined political and military pressure for their release in a way that might succeed where all other methods failed.
Alongside this, it must be admitted that all these steps are just the beginning. Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip is not enough to rehabilitate Israeli society. This is just an immediate choice between two bad options. To unite Israeli society and give us hope for a better future, we must adopt a long-term vision. For this, we will need to recognize the importance of human rights to our national security and the historical connection of Jews and Palestinians to all parts of the land. These issues will be addressed in the subsequent article.
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